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CRIMINAL LAW
PSYCHOLOGICAL ABNORMALITY AS A FACTOR IN GRADING CRIMINAL
LIABILITY: DIMINISHED CAPACITY, DIMINISHED
RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LIKE
GEORGE E. DIX*
INTRODUCTION
During early 1969, the trial of Sirhan B. Sirhan
for the killing of Senator Robert Kennedy pro-
vided a sixty day, $900,000 public demonstration
of California's efforts to integrate creatively con-
temporary psychological knowledge with criteria
for criminal responsibility. The demonstration
did not prove an unqualified success. Testimony
by defense expert Doctor Martin M. Schorr, a
clinical psychologist, that Sirhan lacked the
capacity to entertain the state of mind required
under California law for murder was translated by
a prosecutor for newsmen as, "If you hate a guy a
little bit and kill him it's murder; if you hate a
guy a lot and kill him, you're sick."' When Doctor
Bernard L. Diamond, well-known for his writings
on law and psychology and his personal partici-
pation in leading California cases,2 presented his
theory that Sirhan had shot Senator Kennedy
while in an abnormal state of mind induced by
flashing lights and mirrors at the scene, he cau-
tioned the jury that his theory was "an absurd,
preposterous story, unlikely and incredible, which
in a unique case such as Sirhan's does raise the
gravest problems of clinical proof and credibility." 3
In his dosing argument to the jury, the prosecutor
declared, "I have heard that Charles Dickens
wrote in a book that 'the law is an ass.' I think the
law became an ass when it let the psychiatrist get
his hand on it. It would be a frightening thing for
justice to decide a case of this magnitude on
whether [Sirhan] saw clowns playing patty-cake
or kicking each other in an ink blot test." 4 After
sixteen hours and forty-two minutes of delibera-
tion, the jury returned a verdict of guilty to first
* Associate Professor of Law, Arizuna State Uni-
versity.I N.Y. Times, March 12, 1966, at 24, Col. 3.
2See the discussion of People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal.2d
716,336 P.2d 492 (1959), at note 81 infra.
3N.Y. Times, March 28, 1966, at 19, Col. 1.
4 Id., April 15, 1966, at 18, Col. 1.
degree murder; the next week the same jury im-
posed the death penalty. 'q think the jury took the
testimony of the psychiatrist and psychologist into
consideration fairly", one juror told newsmen, "but
the feeling was that they contradicted each other
and even themselves from time to time." '
The obvious difficulty, experienced by both
participants and observers in the Sirhan trial in
evaluating testimony as to Sirhan's state of mind
stems from the controversy surrounding Cali-
fornia's so-called diminished capacity rule' under
which evidence of the defendent's state of mind
was admitted. California's rule is, however, merely
one possible answer to a broader question that has
troubled the criminal law for many years: Is proof
of the defendant's psychological abnormality, that
is, the manner in which he differs from the rational,
utilitarian man of the classical criminologists,7
admissible other than for the purpose of establish-
ing the "insanity" defense and may it be considered
by the trier of fact in assessing criminal liability?
The issue is, of course, intimately related to the
5Arizona Republic, April 25, 1966, at 14, Col. 2. An
interesting discussion of Sirhan's psychological condi-
tion as well as the trial testimony and tactics is KAnSER,
R.F.K. MUST Dix! (1970).
6 This is the position that evidence of psychological
abnormality is admissible to disprove the state of mind
required for the crime, adopted by the California Su-
preme Court in People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330, 202
P.2d 53 (1949). Wells is discussed in the text accom-
panying note 29 infra, and the diminished responsi-
bility rule is discussed in the text accompanying note 62
fra.7 This is not an indisputable definition of psychologi-
cal abnormality. Many mental health professionals
would, of course, argue that the classical utilitarian
man would not be "normal," if indeed he could be
found at all. Some might argue that psychological ab-
normality, assuming it can be defined, should not be
legally significant in determining criminal liability un-
less it is of a given degree of severity, i.e., enough to
constitute "mental illness." But since the matter is
wide open in this regard and the criminal law assumes
the rational utilitarian man, psychological abnormality
seems best defined as any deviation from this model.
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grading of offer o - Pnd amounts to an attempt to
integrate grading and the psychology of the of-
fender. The question may arise when such evidence
is offered by a defendant, when instructions are
requested directing the jury to consider such evi-
dence and telling them how to do so, and when a
defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to support a verdict.
The attempt to integrate grading of offenses and
the psychology of the offender is by no means a
recent development; it has received relatively ex-
tensive consideration by both courts and com-
mentators. In its only consideration of the matter,9
the United States Supreme Court in 1946 refused
to overturn, either as a matter of evidentiary law
or in the exercise of its supervisory powers, the
decision of the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia that a trial court in a homicide prose-
cution had not erred in refusing to instruct the
jury to consider the accused's mental illness in
determining whether he had harbored "malice
aforethought" at the time of the alleged killing.
Suggesting that experience had not clearly demon-
strated the fallacy of the position taken by the
Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court declined
to express an opinion on the merits of the issue and
relegated the matter to legislative action or the
discretionary powers of the lower courts."0
The issue seems, however, to have experienced a
recent revival in the state appellate courts. Several
courts, for example, have recently held such proof
8 It has been suggested that insofar as the matter
has been litigated in American courts, it applies only to
homicide cases. State v. Gilmore, 242 Ore. 463, 469 n.
2, 410 P.2d 240, 243 n. 2 (1966). It has also been sug-
gested that the "diminished responsibility" doctrine is,
in fact, applied only in capital cases as a means of void-
ing a death penalty not voidable on other grounds.
United States v. Hazeltine, 419 F. 2d 579, 581 n. 3 (9th
Cir. 1969). Although it is true that the appellate cases
often involve homicide cases in which the death pen-
alty has been imposed, there is no doctrinal reason
why it could not be raised in other situations. In Cali-
fornia, for example, several of the major cases have
in olved homicide convictions in which the death
penalty was not imposed. See People v. Conley, 64
Cal.2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966);
People v. Wolff, 61 Cal.2d 794, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 271 (1964). The cases state that the California
Supreme Court does not disapprove of its "diminished
capacity" rule being applied in nonhomicide cases. See
People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949)
("leading case," in which court approved of such evi-
dence in prosecution for assault by a prisoner); People
v. Gentry, 257 Cal. App.2d 607, 65 Cal. Rptr. 235(1968) (Diminished capacity unsuccessfully invoked in
bad check case).
Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1916). See
note 47 infra.
10 328 U.S. at 476.
not entitled to evidentiary significance despite
earlier language in their decisions suggesting that it
would properly be considered1 On the other hand,
one state court has apparently assumed that con-
stitutional considerations required that proof of
psychological abnormality be given full evidentiary
significance in regard to the state of mind of the
defendant at the time of the alleged offense' 2
Despite the significant amount of literature on
the subject," the recent flurry of attention the
problem has received in the popular press as well
as in the case law and legal commentaries suggests
that a reexamination is in order.
Doctrinal work in this area must be done with
frank acknowledgement of the difficulty of relating
1 Painter v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 360, 171
S.E.2d 166 (1969) (Offer of psychological evidence as
to whether defendant acted with malice aforethought
or whether he premeditated properly refused) (Does
not mention language in Dejarnette v. Commonwealth,
75 Va. 867, 880-81 (1881):
there are, doubtless, cases in which, whilst the
prisoner may not be insane.., yet he may be in
that condition from partial aberration or enfeeble-
ment of intellect which renders him incapable of
the sedate, deliberate and specific intent necessary
to constitute murder in the first degree);
Curl v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 474, 162 N.W.2d 77 (1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1004 (1969) (disapproving any
suggestion in Hempton v. State, 111 Wis. 127, 86 N.W.
596 (1901), that mental abnormality short of insanity
was relevant to guilt). Cf. Hashfield v. State, 247 Ind.
95, 210 N.E.2d 429 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 921
(1966), making clear that language in Sage v. State,
91 Ind. 141 (1883) (A defendant has a right to have
his mental condition at the time of the crime put before
the jury) did not authorize a defense of "partial in-
sanity."
12 Shaw v. State, 106 Ariz. 103,471 P.2d 715 (1970),
cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3313 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1971). In
dicta, the Arizona Supreme Court indicated that the
bifurcated trial procedure, which separated the trial
of "guilt" from that of "insanity," violated the due
process rights of the accused. The legislative intent was
that evidence of mental illness be admitted only at the
second trial on the sanity issue, the court reasoned, and
since this deprived the accused of his right to have all
relevant evidence as to his state of mind introduced at
the first trial (including any proof of mental illness),
the procedure must fall. For a discussion of the case
and the issues raised by it, see Dix, Mental Illness,
Criminal "Intent," and the Bifurcated Trial, LAW AD
THE SocrL ORDER 559 (1970).
"3 See, e.g., S. GLuTEcK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE
Cp -rhAL LAw 199-208 (1925); M. GUTTM CER &
H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHiATRY AND THE LAW 426-33
(1951); R. PERKINGS, CamrsAL LAw 878-83 (2d ed.
1969); H. WEmOPEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CaIM-
NAL DEFENSE 175-95 (1954); Keedy, Insanity and
Criminal Responsibility, 30 HAtv. L. REv. 535 (1917);
Keedy, A Problem of First Degree Murder: Fisher v.
United States, 99 U. PA. L. Rxv. 26 (1950); Taylor,
Partial Insanity as Affecting the Degree of Crime-A
Commentary on Fisher v. United States, 34 CAL. L. REv.
625 (1946); Weihofen, Partial Insanity and Criminal
Intent, 24 ILL. L. REv. 505 (1930).
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it to reality. While the relationship between formal
doctrine and the administration of the law-in-fact
is still a highly uninvestigated area, there is a
growing body of literature that suggests what every
practicing lawyer knows: the relationship between
doctrine and administration is neither as simple
and direct nor as important as has traditionally
been postulated.1 4 But this does not mean that
doctrinal analysis is of no value or that more
careful consideration of the empirical effects of
doctrinal alternatives cannot assist the criminal
justice system in accomplishing its goal.
I. SuBJEcTIVE AND OBJECTrvE FACTORS IN
DETERMINING CRnMNAL LIABILITY
The use of psychological abnormality is only
one of numerous ways in which the substantive
criminal law might investigate the subjective state
of mind of the offender. To place the issue of psy-
chological abnormality in proper perspective, it is
necessary to review briefly the significance of the
offender's mental state in criminal liability doc-
trine. This can best be done by positing two polar
models and then examining the extent to which
these models have been accepted in formal doc-
trine.
A. The Models of Liability
The use of models is often helpful to the under-
standing of the relationship between apparently
conflicting approaches of the law to related issues. 5
By carefully examining the choices which must be
made on each issue, variations in the way the
choice is made can often be better understood. This
is as true with the substantive criminal law as
with other areas. The models, for the sake of con-
venience, can be labeled the "subjective model of
criminal liability" and the "objective model of
criminal liability."
1. The Subjective Model
The subjective model emphasizes the charac-
teristics of the particular offender. Liability is
124 For work regarding the effect of the doctrinal
formulation of the insanity defense, see A. GornsTEiN,
THE INshrr DEFENSE (1967); R. SIMON, THE Juny
AND THE DEFENSE OF NsANIrry (1967).15H. PACKER, THE LIMIrs oF THE CRIMINAL SANC-
TION 152-54 (1968), develops the value of models as a
way to discuss a system which must accommodate com-
peting value systems and the value systems themselves.
Such an analysis focuses attention on the overall com-
petition between or among value systems and the need
to examine each aspect of the process to determine
what choice has been made at that point.
properly imposed only if it is established that (1)
the individual has violated or endangered a social
interest, (2) the individual's actions or failure to act
violated a rule of which the offender was aware,
(3) the offender himself acknowledged at the time
that this rule "should" have been obeyed, and (4)
the offender's decision to violate the rule was not
significantly influenced by factors other than the
philosophical decision to violate the norm. This
model, of course, emphasizes "moral culpability"
by authorizing liability only when the offender has
voluntarily, in the broadest sense of the word,
violated a norm which he himself recognized as
deserving his adherence. It also serves the utili-
tarian function of restricting the imposition of
punishment to those cases in which it is most likely
to serve the preventive objective. Assuming that
the preventive function is performed by specific
and general deterrence, the subjective model also
represents reliance upon the assumption that
punishment can only be effective upon those who
are aware of its existence, who are aware of their
choice to incur liability or not, and who are free
from any influence that renders freedom to exer-
cise this choice nonexistent.
2. The Ojective Model
The objective model, on the other hand, empha-
sizes the threat which an individual poses directly
to social interests protected by criminal sanctions.
Liability is properly imposed if the individual in
fact has demonstrated that he poses a threat to
social interests, that is, if it is established that the
individual has, by his actions or omissions, vio-
lated or endangered a social interest.
The objective model may rest upon acceptance
of the retributive justification for punishment:
punishment is justified if the individual has caused
the damage or danger that the law prohibits.18
But it may also represent a conclusion that impos-
ing objective liability serves the preventive func-
tion of the law. Imposing liability without regard
to state of r~nd may serve the "educating" or
"moralizing" function by demonstrating and
emphasizing social disapproval of the action. 7 It
may also serve to deter those who might otherwise
16See e.g., P. BRETT, AN INQUIRY INTO CRIMINAL
GUILT 51 (1963).17 For a good summary of the terminology involved
and the issues presented by the policy difference, see
Hawkins, Punishment and Deterrence: The Educative,




rely upon being erroneously found not responsible
by virtue of their subjective state of mind 8
Substantive criminal law doctrine represents a
series of compromises between these two models of
liability. Doctrinal development has been piece-
meal and, many would argue, less sophisticated
than in most other areas of American law. But the
problem of consideration of psychological abnor-
mality cannot be adequately evaluated without an
adequate understanding of the various compro-
mises at other points which the law has made.
B. Doctrinal Choices Between the Models
Liability for criminal punishment is traditionally
said to require that the individual have enter-
tained an "evil" mind and have translated that
state of mind into action or, in a limited number of
situations, inaction. But the general state-of-mind
requirement 19 for liability is itself a compromise.
18 See, e.g., Andenaes, General Pre-vention, 43 J. CRUU.
L. C. & P.S. 176, 179-81 (1952).
19 Although the use of the terms inens rea, general
intent, and specific intent has given rise to much con-
fusion, they are used here in what is probably the least
confusing manner. Mens rea means the state of mind
required by the substantive law for liability; this varies,
obviously, from offense to offense. General intent means
purpose, knowledge, or recklessness with regard to each
element of the offense. Whether general intent is part
of the mens rea for any crime depends upon the sub-
stantive law definining that crime. Specific intent
means a substantive requirement of a state of mind in
regard to something that is not itself an element of the
offense. See generally R. PERKINS, CRIMNAL LAW 739-
45 (2nd ed. 1969).
There is some indication that psychological abnor-
mality might be relevant in the determination of
whether a criminal defendant has committed a "willed
act." Thus an act committed while unconscious does
not give rise to criminal liability. See People v. Wilson,
66 Cal.2d 749, 427 P.2d 820 59 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1967);
State v. Mercer, 275 N.C. 108, 165 S.E.2d 328 (1969).
But it seems clear that if the alleged unconsciousness
was purpoitcJly caused by a psychological abnormality
that might give rise to legal "insanity," the effect of it
must be judged by the insanity criteria and not by the
"unconsciousness" test. See State v. Wilson, 66 Cal.
2d 749, 756 n.2, 427 P.2d 820, 825 n. 2 59 Cal. Rptr.
156, 161 n. 2, (1967). It has also been asserted that if
an act was "involuntary," as by reason of alcoholism,
the defendant has not thereby committed an "act"
within the meaning of the traditional actus reus require-
ment. Tao, Legal Problems of Alcoholism, 37 FORDHAMI
L. RFv. 404, 407 (1969). As in the case of the "uncon-
sciousness" defense, however, doctrinal order seems to
demand that this rule be limited to "involuntariness"
caused by factors that could not be within the ambit
of the insanity defense. In any case, insofar as psycho-
logical abnormality gives rise to "unconsciousness" or
"involuntariness" within the meaning of these doc-
trines, it results in absolving the accused of criminal
liability. Since this is an all-or-nothing proposition, it
has little relevance to the present problem, the grading
of the liability of one admittedly criminally liable.
Although there is historical evidence that it ini-
tially required a bad motive or purpose, demand
that the criminal law be used to protect society
against individuals who are less culpable but
nevertheless dangerous has led to a dilution of the
evil mind requirement to the point of requiring
only an awareness of acts, circumstances, or the
occurrence of results that are evaluated objec-
tively as antisocial.20 The requirement is now one
of conscious awareness alone. As Helen Silving has
stated:
The law proceeds on the assumption that any given
'intentional act' is ascribable to a particular 'in-
tent,' which psychologically appears as an isolated
event or at least as an event separable from other
psychological phenomena. It thus singles out
from the dynamic continuity of a human life one
act and a particular intent, directed towards it or
its consequences. Inquiry into total personality
development, which culminated in the particular
act in issue, indeed even into the specific motive
which produced the intent to carry out the act, is
barred."
In addition, no conscious acknowledgement of the
wrongfulness of the situation is usually required
for liability; even an awareness of the law's formal
proscription seldom need be established.
Moreover, reluctance to extend every criminal
trial into a full examination of the offender's mind
has prompted the law to grant the prosecution the
benefit of the presumption that every man intends
the natural consequences of his actions.2 Both in
2
s See, e.g., J. HALL, GENERAL PRItrun'izs or CRim-
NAL LAW 83 (2nd ed. 1960). But see Mueller, On Com-
mon Law Mens Rea, 42 MLnN. L. REv. 1043, 1059
(1958).
21 Silving, Psychoanalysis and the Criminal Law, 51
J. CRIM. L. C. & P.S. 19, 24 (1960).
Some courts, however, fail to recognize this limita-
tion. See, e.g., State v. Linn, 93 Idaho 430, 437 462
P.2d 729, 736 (1969): "Authority holds that the word
intentional is synonymous with 'voluntary'"
n The presumption is often invoked in appellate
cases to sustain a verdict under circumstances contain-
ing adequate circumstantial proof of the requisite state
of mind. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 157 Conn. 351, 254
A.2d 447 (1969); State v. LeVier, 202 Kan. 544, 451
P.2d 142 (1969). But in some cases it is invoked where
adequacy of proof of intent is questionable. In State
v. Carlson, 5 Wis. 2d 593, 93 N.W.2d 354 (1958), for
example, the defendant was charged with arson which
the court acknowledged required intent to burn the
structure. The defendant admitted having lighted a
candle under a stairway of the structure, holding the
candle to an inner tube, trying to squeeze the fire out
when it began to hiss and bubble, and finally running
away. In sustaining the convinction, the court held
that the fire was the "natural and probable result" of
the acts which defendant's admissions proved, there
[Vol. 62
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substance and in manner of proof then, the general
inens rea requirement represents a significant com-
promise between the subjective and objective
models of liability.
Deviations from the general state of mind re-
quirement complicate the picture. So-called "strict
liability" offenses-in which general intent is not
required in regard to one or more elements of the
offense 23-are relatively common, although inade-
quate judicial analysis often makes the exact
requirements for liability difficult to determine.
Requirements beyond general intent-so-called
"specific" intents-usually represent, where they
exist, a swing towards the subjective model. But
such specific intents have developed piecemeal in
regard to a number of attempt-like offenses, and
no overall consistent approach is generally dis-
cernible.
The compromises and their variety become even
more obvious in an examination of the traditional
defenses to criminal liability. The rule that only a
reasonable mistake of fact can negate a "general"
intent has as its results the potential imposition of
liability for a failure to live up to an objective
standard.14 The limitation often imposed upon the
availability of intoxication as negating state of
mind-that it too may only negate a specific
was a presumption that he intended such results, and
the jury reasonably concluded that the defendant failed
to rebut this presumption by raising a reasonable doubt
as to his state of mind. But see State v. Lundstrom, 285
Minn. 130, 171 N.W.2d 718 (1969) (Evidence, includ-
ing battery upon wife, left substantial doubt as to
whether defendant had intended death of wife which
followed battery). The presumption may also be used
as a compromise in situations involving strong policy
support for strict liability. See People v. Vogel, 46
Cal.2d 798, 299 P.2d850 (1956), rejectingthegeneralrule
that a bigamy defendant's awareness of the facts mak-
ing his marriage bigamous is irrelevant, but holding
that showing the second marriage is part of a prima
facie case and the defendant bears the burden of prov-
ing lack of knowledge of facts leaving him free to marry.
In a final category of cases, the presumption is relied
upon for holdings that impose liability which is strict
in the sense of not requiring at least "general intent."
See People v. Allen, 117 Ill. App.2d 20, 254 N.E.2d
103 (1969), concluding that since the defendant crimi-
nally invaded the victim's home and an injury to the
victim resulted, the defendant's conviction of battery
must stand since "everyone is held to comtemplate and
be responsible for the natural consequences of his act".
See also State v. Viekel, 2 Conn. Cir. 459, 202 A.2d
250 (1964), in which the court expressly acknowledged
that it was imposing liability for resisting arrest with-
out regard to whether the defendant was aware of the
legality of the attempted arrest.23 See generally Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S.
246 (1952). For a recent case holding a "strict liabil-
ity" felony unconstitutional, see Speidel v. State, 460
P.2d 77 (Alas. 1969).
2 R. P Rxms, CRnaNAL LAW 940-41 (2nd ed.
1969).
intent-is an equally obvious compromise.25 But
the M'Naghten formulation of the insanity de-
fense28 is perhaps the most blatant. By restricting
the legal relevance of a defendant's psychological
abnormality to proof of a defect of his cognitive
abilities of such a nature as to render it impossible
for him to know the nature and quality of his act,
or to know that it is "wrong," the law formally
ignores much of the actual impact of psychological
abnormality upon an offender.27
This brief discussion of the varying approach of
the substantive criminal law towards the compet-
ing models makes the doctrinal problem posed by
any attempt to integrate the psychological abnor-
mality of offenders and the grading of criminal
liability clearer: although the law has sometimes
publicly embraced the proposition that there is no
guilt without an evil mind, substantive criminal
law doctrine in fact represents a series of varying
compromises between subjective and objective
models of liability. The extent to which guilt de-
pends upon the offender's personal psychology-
his actual state of mind--differs with the crime
involved as well as the defenses asserted. Having
developed no consistent approach to the legal
relevance of the offender's psychology, the law is
understandably less than prepared to respond to
another demand to integrate the offender's state of
mind into the scheme for determining or grading
his criminal liability.
The purpose of this article is to examine the
actual or potential relationship of psychological
abnormality and the grading of liability. Before
examining the specific ways in which this might be
accomplished, the task undertaken in Part III,
it would be valuable to consider how courts have
formally responded to requests that they consider
psychological abnormality in some manner other
than raising the defense of insanity. This is the
subject of Part IL
II. JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF
PSYcHOLOGICAL ABNORMALITY
SHORT OF 'INSANITY"
As both the legal and the lay community have
gained psychological sophistication, attempts to
25 See People v. Hood, 1 CaL3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82
Cal. Rptr. 618, (1969);26 M Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (Lords 1843).
27 Some courts have failed to recognize that tradi-
tional formulations of the insanity defense do not
simply permit a defendant to convince the trier of fact
that he did not have the state of mind required for the
crime. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 417 F.2d 267
(2d Cir. 1969); Smith v. State, __ Miss._, 220 So.
2d 313 (1969).
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use psychological knowledge in assessing criminal
liability have increased. Given the rapid develop-
ment of psychology, especially since World War
II, only relatively recent cases are of any real
value; the general language in the early cases
suggesting that such abnormality is properly a
factor in assessing criminal liability was written
under such different conditions than those now
existing that it deserves only minimal attention.
A. Consideration Favorable to the Use of Such Evi-
dence
Those courts that have found evidence of psy-
chological abnormality properly accepted and
consideredN have generally done so on the theory
that such evidence is relevant to the issue of the
defendant's state of mind. The leading case on this
point is the California Supreme Court's decision in
People v. Wells.29 Wells, charged with an assault
"with malice aforethought," offered evidence that
at the time of the assault he was in a "state of
tension" and as a result had an abnormal fear for
his personal safety. Consequently, defense experts
28Beckstead v. People, 133 Colo. 72, 292 P.2d 189
(1956) (Trial court erred in rejecting at first portion of
bifurcated trial evidence tending to show that defendant
lacked ability to form intent required for first degree
murder); State v. Clokey, 83 Idaho 322, 364 P.2d 159(1961) (Instruction that abnormal mental condition
might be considered in determining whether "specific
mental factor" existed "properly stated the law");
State v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 126 N.W.2d 385(1964) (Trial court properly instructed jury to con-
sider mental abnormality as going to whether de-
fendant premeditated, but refusal to instruct jury to
consider this evidence as going to whether defendant
had general intent or malice aforethought also proper);
Washington v. State, 165 Neb. 275, 85 N.W.2d 509
(1957) (Error to instruct jury that evidence of low
I.Q. and "inferior thinking capacity and inferior judge-
ment" would go to punishment only, since it could also
establish failure to deliberate and premeditate); State
v. De Paolo, 34 N.J. 279, 168 A.2d 401 (1961) (Evi-
dence of mental illness or deficiency admissible to
prove lack of premeditation if it rationally bears on that
issue); State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d 312
(1959) (Defendant entitled to jury instruction that
mental condition and defects could be considered in de-
termining whether he had the power to deliberate);
Fox v. State, 73 Nev. 241, 316 P.2d 924 (1957) (Evi-
dence of insanity may be used to show that although
the defendant was presumptively capable of pre-
meditating he in fact did not, although it may not be
used to prove lack of capacity to premeditate), dis-
approving language in State v. Fisko, 58 Nev. 65, 70
P.2d 1113 (1937) to the contrary; State v. Green, 78
Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177 (1931) (In view of evidence de-
fendant's abnormality, trial court erred in failing to
instruct on voluntary manslaughter, since mental ill-
ness can render one incapable of deliberating, pre-
meditating, forming malice aforethought or forming
the intent to take life).
- 33 Cal.2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949).
submitted, Wells would fear for his personal safety
and react accordingly in situations in which a
"normal" person would not entertain any such
fear or would not entertain as great a fear.3 0
Commenting that if Wells had acted only on the
basis of honest (though unreasonable) fear he
necessarily would have lacked "malice afore-
thought," the court found the materiality of the
offered evidgnce "patent." 31 Apparently assuming
that the determination of materiality settled the
issue, the court found error in the refusal to admit
the testimony. The Wells analysis is typical. Con-
vinced of the logical relevancy of such evidence to
the state of mind issue, courts approving of its
use have not carefully examined objections to it.
Instead, they have jumped from logical rele-
vancy to admissibility. 2
B. Jvdicial Rejection of Evidence of Psychological
Abnormality
Those courts that have rejected or disapproved
of use of evidence of a defendant's psychological
abnormality have generally been more extensive
in their explanation than courts approving such
use. Judicial discussions of this nature run the
gamut from expressions of broad fears of releasing
dangerous criminals to sophisticated analyses of
the charged offense which conclude that liability
is in fact objective.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, on which a
decreasing majority has vigorously opposed the
use of evidence on psychological abnormality,n
30 Id. at 344-45, 202 P.2d at 62.
11 Id. at 345, 202 P.2d at 62-63.
12 See cases cited in note 28 supra. The American
Law Institute recommended that evidence of a mental
disease or defect be admissible "whenever it is relevant
to prove that the defendant did or did not have a state
of mind which is an element of the offense." MODEL
PENAL CODE §4.02 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) The
comments, although acknowledging that some juris-
dictions do not accord such evidence an admissibility
co-extensive with its relevance, do not discuss the
reasons for such limitations and simply conclude that
the drafters "see no justification for a limitation of this
kind." MODEL PENAL C "z, ;,, nts to " t02 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955). Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE §4.02(2)
(Proposed Official Draft, 1962), making evidence of
impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of the
act or to conform conduct to the law admissible when
the issue is whether to impose the death penality.33Compare Commonwealth v. Ahearn, 421 Pa. 311,
218 A.2d 561 (1966) (4-3 decision) (Verdict of guilty of
first degree murder supported by evidence, and testi-
mony that defendant lacked ability to form intent to
kill because of his mental state induced by feeling the
breasts of the victim or hearing her screams while
being beaten was not properly admitted as disproving
state of mind) and Commonwealth v. Phelan, 427 Pa.
265, 234 A.2d 540 (1967) (5-2 decision) (Medical testi-
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emphasized the increased danger to "law abiding
citizens" that would follow its use.U The Nevada
Supreme Court relied on the more specific objec-
tion that the use of such evidence could lead to
outright acquittal, in which case there would be no
procedural device available to assure protection of
society. Other objections relate to the type of
issues which use of such evidence would raise and
the type of testimony that would be used to re-
solve them. The opinions of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, for example, evince a strong distrust
of the reliability of expert mental health testimony
in general.
36
Courts have also urged that the issue would be
too complex to reasonably expect lay jurors to
resolve7 and, as a result, they fear that the issue
would be turned over to experts to decide, exclud-
ing both judge and jury from the decision-making
process."
Some courts in jurisdictions strongly attached
to the lkcNaghten formulation of the insanity
defense have seen the use of evidence of psychologi-
cal abnormality as either inconsistent with the
insanity defense39 or rendered unnecessary by it.40
mony offered during first phase of bifurcated trial to
prove lack of ability to form intent to kill and to con-
form to the law properly refused) with Commonwealth
v. Rightnor, 435 Pa. 104, 253 A.2d 644 (1969) (Phelan
rule affirmed by equally divided court).
"Commonwealth v. Rightnor, 435 Pa. 104, 119-20,
253 A.2d 644, 651 (1969).
35 Fox v. State, 73 Nev. 241, 244-45, 316 P.2d 924,
926 (1957). Provisions for automatic or quasi-auto-
matic commitment following a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity serve this function upon such a final
disposition of a criminal trial. Similar provision might
be made, of course, for commitment following service
of a sentence imposed upon a finding of "reduced
guilt;" see note 103 infra.36 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carroll, 412 Pa. 525,
535-36, 194 A.2d 911, 917 (1963). Although Carroll
dealt with the sufficiency of the evidence, the attitude
expressed by the court in this case was clearly influen-
tial in the cases cited in note 33 supra.
7Curl v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 474, 485 162 N.W.2d 77,
83 (1968): "Judge and jury ought not to be required to
identify, classify and evaluate all categories and classi-
fications of human behavior beyond establishing the
fact of sanity."
8Commonwealth v. Rightnor, 435 Pa. 104, 119, 253
A.2d 644, 651 (1969). See also Painter v. Common-
wealth, 210 Va. 360, 368, 171 S.E.2d 166, 172 (1969),
asserting that permitting use of such evidence would
invade the province of the jury.
22 State v. Rideau, 249 La. 1111, 193 So. 2d 264(1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 861 (1967) (Statute codify-
ing M'Naughten requires rejection of evidence of
mental illness negating intent or reducing degree of
crime); Commonwealth v. Rightnor, 435 Pa. 104, 253
A.2d 644 (1969); Armstead v. State, 227 Md. 73, 175
A.2d 24 (1961); State v. Fisko, 58 Nev. 65, 70 P.2d
1113 (1937), disapproved in part, Fox v. State, 73 Nev.
The insanity defense might be affected in one of
two ways. Evidence of lack of volition might be
received when it would not be admissible under the
jurisdiction's formulation of the insanity rule. Or,
carefully phrased requirements that only a total
or near-total loss of capacity to comply with legal
requirements would be subverted by permitting
proof of mere reduced capacity to comply. In either
case, the courts apparently have feared that use of
the evidence would subvert the resolution of the
conflicting interests which the insanity rule repre-
sents. On the other side of the coin is the argument
that the relevancy of the evidence is its tendency to
disprove the state of mind required for liability
and if the defendant lacked that state of mind, he
would also come within the insanity defense.4'
Under this view, the function served by a rule
permitting the use of such evidence is already
served by the insanity defense.
The Arizona Supreme Court took another ap-
proach in rejecting such evidence. The court,
considering the use of evidence of psychological
abnormality in a homocide case, affirmed a trial
court's refusal to instruct the jury to consider
such evidence in determining whether the defend-
ant had the state of mind required for murder
(malice aforethought). The court relied upon a
statutory directive that malice "is implied when
no considerable provocation appears" 2 in conclud-
ing that the distinction was essentially objective.4
Thus the proof, which related only to the subjec-
241, 316 P.2d 924 (1957); State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz.
200, 403 P.2d 521 (1965).40 See State v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 126 N.W.2d
285 (1964). Cf. Pinana v. State, 76 Nev. 274, 352 P.2d
824 (1960) (Instruction that "a mind capable of know-
ing right from wrong is a mind capable of entertaining
intent and of deliberating and premeditating" correctly
states the law).
41 In State v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 126 N.W.2d
285 (1964), the court found no reversible error in a re-
fusal to instruct the jury to consider testimony as to
the defendant's "state of severe emotional turmoil" in
regard to the defendant's state of mind. If the de-
fendant lacked the capacity to harbor malice afore-
thought, the court concluded, he could also lack the
capacity to know right from wrong and therefore would
be entitled to acquittal under the insanity instructions.
Id. at 142, 126 N.W.2d at 290.
4 ARIz. Rlv. STAT. AiNw. §13-451(B) (1956).
43People v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200, 403 P.2d 521
(1965). In an earlier case, the same court made even
clearer the objective nature of its view of homicide
liability. In Foster v. State, 37 Ariz. 281, 294 P.268
(1930), the court emphasized that the power to reason,
or intelligence, did not affect the degree of a homicide
offense; if the accused is "sane," "the law implies de-
liberation and premeditation from the circumstances of
the killing." Id. at 290, 294 P. at 271.
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tive state of mind of the offender, was held im-
material.
The final objection raised to the introduction of
evidence relating to psychological abnormality
recognizes the full complexity of the entire matter.
Viewing the issue as involving more than a minor
evidentiary matter, the District of Columbia
circuit in 196044 adhered to its earlier view that
such evidence would not be admissible. 45 Seeing the
underlying task as consolidating gradations of
criminal responsibility and psychological abnor-
mality, the Court found the task inappropriate
for judicial undertaking:
The problem of classifying, assessing and analyz-
ing the results of the application of modern psy-
chiatry to administration of criminal law as it re-
lates to gradations of punishment according to the
relative intelligence of the defendant is beyond the
competence of the judiciary. Courts are neither
trained nor equipped for this delicate and impor-
tant task. The basic framework for sentences of
punishment must be established by the legislative
branch. Indeed, one can hardly conceive of a proc-
ess less suited to formulating general rules in this
sensitive area, than an adversary proceeding. That
must be done by long range studies by competent
public and quasi-public entities and by legislative
committees with trained staffs aided by objective
technical and scientific witnesses who can deal with
all aspects of the problem, not confined as we are
to the facts of an individual case. 46
C. Evaluation
American case law evaluation of the relevance
of evidence of a criminal defendant's psychological
deviation from the hypothetical rational man has
been distressingly unsatisfactory. judicial discus-
sion ranges from almost hysterical diatribes against
mental health personnel in general to relatively de-
tailed doctrinal analyses which ultimately conclude
that the purported doctrinal requirement of a
subjective state of mind is in fact a fiction. But
"4 Stewart v. United States, 275 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir.
1960), rev'd on other grounds, 366 U.S. 1 (1961).
45 in Fisher v. T-v;l-- States, 149 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir.
1945), aff'd, 328 U.S. 463 (1946), the court had held
that the jury was properly not instructed to consider
psychological abnormality as disproving state of mind.
In Stewart v. United States, 214 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir.
1954), the court was urged to reconsider the matter
but declined on the basis that a reevaluation should
await some evidence of the effect of the expanded in-
sanity defense announced in Durham v. United States,
214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
46 Stewart v. United States, 275 F.2d 617, 624 (D.C.
Cir. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 366 U.S. 1 (1961).
This view was adhered to in Stewart v. U,,ted States,
394 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
underlying many such discussions is another de-
ficiency that may to some extent help to explain
the inadequacies of the judicial analyses. This is the
frequent lack of apparent relevance of offered testi-
mony to the allegedly applicable legal doctrine. It
is most obvious in cases in which psychodynami-
cally-oriented experts testify in conclusory terms
that a defendant lacks "intent" or in which the
testimony is offered for the purpose, although the
substance of the testimony is that the act was to
some extent influenced by the unconscious opera-
tion of defense mechanisms.
One of the best illustrations of this problem is the
much-criticized case of Fisher v. United States.47
Fisher, a custodian, had assaulted and killed a
librarian who had complained about the inade-
quacies of his work and called him a "black nigger"
in his presence. At trial,4s a clinical psychologist
testified that Fisher had an I.Q. of 76. The defense
rested primarily, however, upon the testimony of
Ernest Y. Williams, M.D., a neurologist and psy-
chiatrist on the Howard Medical School faculty.
Dr. Williams testified that Fisher had a psycho-
pathic personality associated with chronic alco-
holism and early schizoic tendencies. He noted a
flattening of affect and limitations of information,
judgment, and comprehension and testified that in
his opinion Fisher had been unable to resist the
impulse to kill. He declined to respond categori-
cally to whether Fisher was insane at the time of
the killing. At one point, Dr. Williams made the
conclusory statement that "I doubt whether he
was able to entertain an intent to kill her." A
government rebuttal witness testified that an
individual of Fisher's mental age had eighty per-
cent of normal intellectual function. The case
appears to have been tried on an insanity theory,
although defense counsel did request instructions
that the jury consider Fisher's entire personality
and his mental, nervous, and emotional charac-
teristics in determining the existence of the state
of mind. On appeal, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit affirmed the denial of the instructions on the
alternative ground that there was no evidence
justifying them. 9 On certiorari to the Supreme
Court, the government argued that even if such
instructions were required in an appropriate case,
the evidence in this case was not of that degree of
specificity that would enable the jury to determine
47 328 U.S. 463 (1949).
4The testimony is summarized in Transcript of
Record at 83-95, Fisher v. United States, 32Q U.S. 463
(1946).




whether or not Fisher had the capacity to deliber-
ate or premeditate.50 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court elected to treat the case as if there had been
extensive trial development of Fisher's capacity to
entertain the conscious desire to cause the victim's
death. The Court held that trial juries need not be
instructed to consider psychological abnormality in
determining the existence of premeditation.
The Court's treatment of the record as exten-
sively developed on the issue of mental capacity
was ill-founded. While Dr. Williams' testimony as
to Fisher's limitations might have been related to
capacity to premeditate, no attempt was made to
develop this. The psychiatrist's statement that he
entertained doubt as to Fisher's ability to entertain
intent to kill was never explained or developed and,
as the record stood, remained an unsupported
assertion. Given the actual development of the
facts before the jury, it would have been quite
reasonable to resolve the case as the government
suggested-there was simply not sufficient informa-
tion before the jury, qualitatively or quantitatively,
to justify having them determine the defendant's
capacity to entertain desire or awareness or to per-
form the evaluations necessary for premeditation.
Indeed, it is likely that the inadequate record in
Fisher affected the willingness of the Supreme
Court to resolve the issue. In Fisher, the defense
was really asking the jury to consider inability to
control conduct under the rubric of incapacity to
entertain the requisite state of mind. Given this
logical inconsistency between the testimony and
the theory under which it was offered, there is an
understandable basis for what might be regarded
as an inadequate judicial treatment of the issue.
The case law, then, has been characterized by a
failure to analyze carefully the substance of the
testimony offered or accepted, and, consequently,
by a failure to formulate and resolve the doctrinal
issues skillfully. Part III attempts a clarification of
this area by distinguishing among the principal
doctrinal vehicles under which evidence of a de-
fendant's psychological abnormality might be
considered and broadly outlines the issues raised
by each.
III. ALTERNATIVE WAYS IN WHIcH PSYCHO-
LOGICAL ABNORMALITY MIGHT BE USED
I- ASSESSING CRIMINAL LIABILITY
The case law, as Part H indicated, seldom evalu-
ates critically the logical relevance of evidence
offered regarding a defendant's psychological
10 Respondent's Brief at 36-38, Fisher v. United
States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946).
abnormality. Consequently, the doctrinal issues
are seldom well-defined and evaluated. The first
task, therefore, is to distinguish carefully the alter-
native ways in which such evidence might be rele-
vant to criminal liability. There seem to be four
alternatives. The evidence might go to establish a
general mitigating factor (the "partial responsi-
bility" approach). It might go to establish the
absence of the state of mind required by the exist-
ing law defining the crime, either by proving in-
ability to entertain that state of mind (the "di-
minished capacity" approach) or by proving that
despite the capacity to entertain that state of mind
the defendant did not in fact entertain it. It might
also tend to prove a lack of a causal relationship
between traditional mens rea and the act relied
upon to establish liability. Finally, the required
state of mind might be modified in a manner that
makes the psychological abnormality more mean-
ingful, and the evidence would then go to the ab-
sence of this modified state of mind. To some ex-
tent these different doctrinal formulations of the
issues raise significantly different underlying pol-
icy issues. They must, then, be considered sepa-
rately.
A. Psychological Abnormality as a Mitigating Factor
Based on the European Model
One means of relating a defendant's psychologi-
cal abnormality to criminal liability is followed in a
number of European countries. 51 This alternative,
however, does not purport to relate directly the
elements of the offense and the reduction in re-
sponsibility, but gives the court or the jury the
power to reduce the penalty for the offense., -
Under the English Homicide Act of 1957, 53 a
similar approach is taken to liability for homicide
offenses, although the relevance of the abnormality
is not only the punishment but the formal grade
of the offense. A defendant may avoid conviction
for murder by reducing the degree of the offense to
manslaughter af he establishes that, at the time of
the crime, he was suffering from an "abnormality
of the mind" which "substantially impaired his
mental responsibility" in regard to the killing.
"1See generally ROY.L Co inssioN ON CAPiTAL
PtGISHMENT 1949-53, REPOnT, App. 9, at 414-16
(1953) for a summary of the European provisions.
-2The Italian Penal Code, for example, permits a
sentence below the standard minimum for the offense
if, at the time of the offense, the accused was in such a
state of mind because of partial insanity that his
capacity for understanding and his volition were
greatly diminished. Id. at 415.
"English Homicide Act of 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11,
§2.
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Some American courts seem to have interpreted
offers of evidence of psychological abnormality as
arguing for the recognition of a similar doctrine in
this country. The District of Columbia Circuit, for
example, in assuming that the task before it would
involve "classifying, assessing and analyzing the
results of the application of modern psychiatry to
administration of criminal punishment as it relates
to gradations of punishment," " apparently antici-
pated that the use of psychological abnormality
would not be tied to existing gradations and defini-
tions of offenses but rather would require a com-
plete reworking of the grading of offenses. Never-
theless, it is unlikely that such a proposal has been
seriously proposed to American courts. The con-
fusion is undoubtedly traceable, in part, to the fact
that courts are asked to use, in disproving state of
mind, evidence that simply does not logically
relate to the existing requirements for liability.
In any case, it is doubtful whether such an alter-
native could be easily integrated into the usual
framework of criminal liability. The general pat-
tern of American criminal law does not lend itself
to simplified grading of offenses. In some limited
areas the task would not be extremely difficult. The
homicide offenses, for example, provide the basic
framework for several grades of criminal homicide
which could conceivably be differentiated by means
of subjective psychological factors, and this to some
extent is already done by the substantive law in
most jurisdictions. The existence of simple and
aggravated assault and battery crimes provides a
somewhat less wieldy possibility in that area. But
in general, there is not sufficient organization of the
statutory crimes to permit the application of a
general defense which has the effect of reducing the
grade of the offense. Those jurisdictions that have
revised their substantive criminal law and fit all
offenses into a limited number of gradations offer
better possibilities. 55 There would be little mechani-
cal difficulty caused by simply providing that if a
defendant establishes that at the time of the
crime his responsibility was substantially impaired,
the conviction must be for an offense one grade
below what it would otherwise be.
But even under such favorable mechanical
conditions, such a step would cause difficulty.
One problem would be the relationship between
this doctrine and the "insanity" defense or its
equivalent which, if successfully asserted, com-
54See text accompanying note 46 supra.
51 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL CODE §55.05 (McKinney
1967).
pletely absolves the defendant of criminal responsi-
bility.6 Related to this is the danger that such a
rule would run contrary to the function of grading
of offenses. Grading of offenses serves two purposes.
First, it differentiates among offenses on the
grounds of degree of blameworthiness which the
law attaches to the offense. Second, it differentiates
among offenses on the basis of the extent to which
punishment or incapacitation is necessary to
protect society from the offender or others poten-
tially like him. Reducing the degree of the offense
because of psychological abnormality might ap-
propriately reflect the reduced blameworthiness
which society attaches to the crime, but it would
also decrease the extent to which society could
look to the criminal system for protection. While
an offender who is psychologically abnormal may
well be less blameworthy, he may also be more
dangerous than one without his impairments. Thus,
to reduce the maximum period of incarceration to
which he may be subjected furthers one purpose of
legislative grading but is inconsistent with the
other. In this regard, the evidence of the offender's
psychological abnormality only highlights an in-
consistency in the entire grading structure. But
special problems are raised by the inconsistency in
this context. The analogous problem raised by the
insanity defense has been resolved by automatic or
quasi-automatic "civil" commitment procedures
put into motion by a verdict of not guilty by reason
of insanity. Such a solution cannot as easily be
engrafted onto a scheme in which the evidence of
psychological abnormality does not result in ac-
quittal but merely in a reduction in liability. To
some extent this problem might be met by authori-
zation to impose either noncriminal hospitaliza-
tion or further incarceration in the criminal system
at the end of a sentence upon a finding of continued
dangerousness. But this is less than an entirely
satisfactory solution. For one thing, "fundamental
fairness" would probably be seen as endangered, if
not violated, by a scheme which imposed both
criminal punishment and noncriminal detention
for the same act. In addition, the problem of deter-
mining dangerousness at the end of a period of
imprisonment is such a difficult one that there is
doubt that it can be relied upon to protect both the
public interest in protection and the offender's
interest in minimizing the deprivation of liberty.
There is also the problem of determining what
characteristics or which psychological abnormali-
16 See text accompanying note 39 supra.
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ties would be relevant to responsibility under such
an approach. This, of course, raises the objection of
many courts that to permit consideration of fac-
tors (such as impairment of volition) under this
rubric is to destroy the jurisdiction's insanity de-
fense by the back door. In practice, of course, this
may be an artificial argument -the formal defini-
tion of the insanity defense may be of no effect
whatsoever upon trial court functions and results.5
But assuming that the doctrine is an important
matter, there is no necessary inconsistency. Inso-
far as a jurisdiction refuses to consider loss of
volition as giving rise to insanity because of the
difficulty of establishing it accurately and because
of doubts as to whether punishing even those with-
out volitional control might prevent offenses by
others, an appropriate balancing of the competing
factors might well lead to the conclusion that the
risks would be worthwhile if the maximum effect
would not be acquittal but merely a reduction in
the grade of the offense.H
67 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
'a This is the approach that has been taken under the
English Homicide Act. In Regina v. Byrne, [1960] 2
Q.B. 396, the court rejected the suggestion that the
psychological abnormality that would justify reducing
murder to manslaughter under the statute meant the
same nature of abnormality as is required for the in-
sanity defense under the M'Naghten rule, except that it
need not be as extreme as is required to successfully
assert a complete defense. To satisfy the requirements
of the Act, the court held, an accused must show "(a)
that he was suffering from an abnormality of mind,
and (b) that such abnormality of mind (i) arose from a
condition of arrested or retarded development of mind
or any inherent causes, or was induced by disease orinjury and (ii) was such as substantially impaired his
mental responsibility for his acts in doing or being a
part to te klig." Id. at 43. "Abnormality of
mid" wa not defined as in M'Naghten, but rather was
held to mean only "a state of mind so different from
that of ordinary human beings that the reasonable
man would term it abnormal." Id. This, the court
made clear, was broad enough to include not only the
ability to perceive reality and form a judgment as to
whether an act is right or wrong, but also "the mind's
activities in all its aspect," including "the ability to
exercise will power to control his physical acts." Id.
Whether an impairment of self control substantially
impaired responsibility for the act, the court con-
tinued, is a question incapable of scientific proof. Thejury must approach the issue "in a broad, common-
sense way" and should only be instructed that the
criterion involves "a mental state which in popular
language (not that of the M'Naghten Rules) a jury
would regard as amounting to partial insanity or being
on the border-line of insanity." Id. at 404.
In the particular case before it the accused had
killed a young girl and mutilated her body. The un-
contradicted testimony of three defense experts was
that the accused was a "sexual psychopath," that he
suffered from perverted sexual desires which he found
it difficult or impossible to control, and that the killing
The problem of defining the showing necessary to
reduce the grade of the offense under such a system
also raises potential constitutional questions. If
the standard is phrased as generally as that in the
English Homicide Act,59 the statutory structure
might be subject to attack on grounds of vague-
ness. 60 To some extent, such a general formulation
offends the interests the preciseness requirement is
designed to protect. While it is unlikely that it
infringes upon a potential offender's right to ad-
vance notice of what constitutes an offense, it
arguably leaves the courts without sufficient guide-
lines to administer the defense. This, of course,
raises the danger of arbitrary administration and
unequal application. On the other hand, it seems
clear that preciseness is a matter of balancing
rather than an inherent characteristic of language.U
for which he was being tried had been committed under
the influence of these desires. After holding that the
trial court erred in instructing the jury that the de-
fense of diminished responsibility was not available on
these facts, the Queen's Bench substituted a verdict of
guilty of manslaughter for the verdict of murder, on
the ground that under proper instruction the jury
could have come to no other conclusion. Id. at 405.
How the doctrine has been applied in practice is not
dear. Wooton, Diminished Responsibility: A Layman's
View, 76 L.Q. Rav. 224 (1960) reports that in the first
twenty-seven months of operation the defense was
asserted in seventy-three cases. In fifty-three it was
successful. A previous history of mental disorder seems
to have most impressed juries, Lady Wooton reports,
and "other distinctions between the successful and the
unsuccessful cases are not easy to find." Id at 225-26.
This study, of course, does not address itself to what
effect the availability of the defense had upon cases
disposed of other than by formal trial.
On the basis of this study, Lady Wooton concluded
that the diminished responsibility approach of the
Homicide Act posed factual issues in individual cases
that were impossible to reliably resolve. Id. at 232.
After more extensive study, she adhered to this view.
B. WOOrON, CRImE AND TnE CRnINAL LAW 66 (1963).
H.L.A. Hart has agreed. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISH-
mN,,T AND REsPoNsmlLrry 186-209 (1968), rejecting
Lady Wooton's argument that no state of mind should
be required for criminal liability but agreeing that be-
cause of the difficulties of proof, psychological abnor-
mality should not be a factor in determining the exist-
ence of the state of mind. These arguments are, of
course, more sophisticated versions of objections that
have appeared in American case law. See text accom-
panying notes 37-38 supra.
19 See text accompanying note 53 supra.
10 See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507
(1948).
61 See the discussion by Justice Frankfurter, id. at
524-25 (dissenting opinion). Cf. Giaccio v. Pennsyl-
vania, 382 U.S. 399, 405 n. 8 (1966):
In so holding [that an authorization for a jury ac-
quitting a person charged with nonfelonies to im-
pose costs upon the defendant was void for vague-
ness] we intend to cast no doubt whatever on the
constitutionality of the settled practice of many
states to leave to juries finding defendants guilty
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In this context, there are strong arguments in
favor of permitting the law to proceed, feeling its
way as it goes, and formulating more precise
standards as the law becomes accustomed to the
subject matter with which it deals. This would also
provide flexibility for the rule to change as knowl-
edge regarding the dynamics of antisocial behavior
improved. The vagueness issue is really a question
of whether the social interest in permitting the law
flexibility in this new area is outweighed by the
danger that abuse of this flexibility will operate to
the detriment of sDecific individuals. On balance,
the value of the flexibility seems to outweigh the
danger.
B. Psychological Abnormality As Proof of Non-
existence of Traditional Ments Rea
In American criminal litigation, psychological
abnormality is most often offered as bearing on
whether the defendant entertained the state of
mind required by the substantive law for liability.6 2
This, of course, is the most logically appealing
formulation. By tying psychological abnormality to
of a crime the power to fix punishment within
legally prescribed limits.
If there is more flexibility in defining the standard for
setting punishment than for imposing liability, it would
seem to follow that the distinctions between degrees of
liability would not have to meet the same standard of
precision as the standards for imposing any liability.
62 In 1917 the Institute of Criminal Law and Crimi-
nology proposed that the sole legal rule relating to
criminal responsibility and mental illness be the follow-
ing:
No person hereafter shall be convicted of any
criminal charge, when at the time of the act or
omission alleged against him, he was suffering from
mental disease and did not have by reason of such
disease the particular state of mind which must
accompany such act or omission in order to consti-
tute the crime charged.
Note, The Proposed Model Statute on Insanity and
Criminal Responsibility, 30 HAgv. L. REv. 179, 179
(1916) (criticising the proposal). See also Keedy, In-
sanity and Criminal Responsibility, 30 HARv. L. REv.
534 Z1917) (defending it). Morris, Psychiatry and the
Dangerous Criminal, 41 So. CAL. L. Rmv. 514, 518-19(1968), supports this position. This same suggestion
was recently served to the National Commini-ion on
Reform on Federal Criminal Laws by its consultant,
Professor David Robinson. Robinson, Consultant's Re-
port on Criminal Responsibility-Mental Illness: Siction
503, AVORKINO PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMISSION
oN REFORM OF rEDERAL CRiNAL LAWS (1970). The
Commission, however, rejected this formulation of the
general insanity defense in favor of a criterion turning
on substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of
conduct or to conform conduct to the requirements of
law. NATIONAL COmI SION R EFORm ON FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFT OF A NEw FEDERAL
CRMINAL CODE §503 (1970). The Comments do not
explain this choice. Id. at Comment to §503.
the existing doctrinal framework, the admission
and consideration of the evidence seems not only
to leave intact traditional criminal law principles
but also to be consistent with them. The law is not
only doing what it has always done, but it is doing
it better with the help of contemporary scientific
knowledge.
The basic question which this raises, which has
been almost ignored in the case law, is whether the
traditional state of mind rules are appropriate
vehicles for integrating contemporary psychologi-
cal theories and criminal liability. There is no
reason why they necessarily should be. Although
the inens rea doctrine has a colorful history and has
undergone significant development,6 its present
framework was established long before the availa-
bility of the types of psychological explanations
for the behavior of particular offenders that are
now offered. There are several characteristics that
make the inens rea doctrine an inappropriate
vehicle for accommodating the new knowledge.
First, it is apparent that the traditional state-of-
mind requirement is only one factor, and not
necessarily the most significant one, in grading
liability. Only in unusual situations, such as the
homicide offenses and assaultive crimes, are there
identifiable gradations based on the mental ele-
ments. Thus the grading pattern of most jurisdic-
tions' substantive criminal law is such that offenses
are not uniformly graded by state of mind. In
addition, as Part I demonstrated, the various as-
pects of the mens rea rule and its corollaries are in
fact compromises between the objective and sub-
jective models of liability. For this reason they may
be poor vehicles for the integration of psychological
abnormality into the grading scheme. As a matter
of doctrine, the requirement of an "evil mind"
does not always in fact cause liability to turn upon
the subjective state of mind of the offender. Not
only, then, does the traditional framework some-
times preclude inquiry into the subjective state of
mind, it is arguable that it does so for reasons un-
related to the purpose for which it would be used in
the diminished responsibility defense. For example,
those advocating consideration of psychological
abnormality frequently point to tic relevance of
intoxication to absence of state of mind. Yet does
this mean that psychological abnormality should be
usable to disprove "specific" intents but not "gen-
eral" intents? Insofar as there is justification for




limiting disproof of state of mind by intoxication to
specific intents, does such justification extend
equally to psychological abnormality?'
But even insofar as traditional doctrine does
make the offender's psychological condition at the
time of the offense a subject of inquiry, it arguably
requires the inquiry to be resolved by application
of criteria which bear little relationship to contem-
porary psychological knowledge. Aside from the
objection that this will lead to simply unsatisfac-
tory results, this raises a preliminary danger that
in practice the doctrine and the testimony will
bear little or no relationship to each other. The
imms rea requirement is based upon assumptions
which, if not inconsistent with those of contempo-
rary mental health personnel, at least do not pro-
vide them with a familiar framework. The basic
problem, therefore, is the same one that has tra-
ditionally plagued the M'Naghten formulation of
the insanity defense. The state of mind require-
ment is one of cognition or awareness 65 Mental
health personnel find it no easier to restrict their
comments to an offender's awareness when the
issue is the existence of a specific state of mind than
when the issue is the insanity defense. Some states
of mind do lend themselves to the type of analysis
that mental health personnel feel is appropriate.
"Premeditation" is one such state of mind, or,
more accurately, one such mental process. An ex-
ample of satisfactory testimony as to the existence
of this process is the testimony offered in the trial
of Charles R. Starkweather for first degree murder.
A defense expert testified in that trial as follows:
[Ila the sense... we think of premeditation...
as considering an act, its possible consequences,
various alternatives,.. . he was not capable of
that; in the sense of proceeding from an impulse to
" The limitations upon the availability of intoxica-
tion as a defense represent a combination of fear that
drunkenness can be feigned, a desire to deter intoxica-
tion, moral judgments regarding the consumption of in-
toxicants, and a desire to secure protection against dan-
gerous drunks, whether they meet the formal criteria for
criminal liability or not. But see the opinion of Chief
Justice Traynor in People v. Hood, I Cal.3d 444, 462
P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969), suggesting that the
distinction has a factual basis:
A drunk man is capable of forming an intent to do
something simple, such as strike another, unless he
is so drunk that he has reached the stage of un-
consciousness. What he is not as capable as a
sober man of doing is exercising judgment about the
social consequences of his acts or controlling his im-
pulses ton,-Ji antisncial acts.
Id. at 458, 462 P.2d at 379, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
11 See text accompanying note 21 supra.
an action, in which the action is broken down into
separate stages, it is possible that he did that.
I believe that when he decides to do some-
thing, he goes ahead and does it. He may plan it;
it may be an act which takes a certain amount of
time, requires certain stages. In taking his car, he
has to think, "'Well, where can we stop and let them
off?" This is part of the planning. I don't think he
thinks of all these things at once, but as he goes
along he thinks of what he has to do next in order
to accomplish his intent.' 11
This testimony distinguishes between "intent" in
the sense of a conscious desire, "planning" in the
sense of considering the mechanical feasibility of
of effectuating that desire, and "premeditation"
in the sense of critically evaluating the pros and
cons of proceeding to effectuate the desire. It ex-
plains in understandable terms how a person could
logically entertain an intent, plan the effectuation
of that intent, but not premeditate regarding the
objective of that intent.
In contrast with this is the situation in the
Pennsylvania case of State v. Sikora.Y Sikora had
shot an individual with whom he had earlier had a
tavern dispute. He returned to his apartment fol-
lowing the dispute, loaded a gun, test-fired and
reloaded it, and left a note saying "The first bul-
let is for [the victim] and the second is for Stella
Miller." The defense testimony was relatively typ-
ical of the type dynamic psychiatrists offer in such
situations: Sikora had been subjected to numer-
ous situations which increased his psychic tension,
including rejection by his girlfriend and the re-
marks made by the victim during the tavern dis-
pute. The stress became so great that his per-
sonality responded with an unconscious defense
mechanism, a manner of dealing with stress on an
unconscious level determined by Sikora's indi-
vidual personality history and development. When
his attention was directed to the functioning of
Sikora's conscious mind, the expert was somewhat
more vague: Sikora was "thinking," the expert
indicated, but "the thinking was automatic".
There were "strong elements of automatism"
present, and Sikora was not "fully conscious of his
activities" and not "completely aware of what he
was doing." He could not, the psychiatrist con-
cluded, conceive the intent to kill.
The evidence in Sikora, like that in many other
cases, demonstrates the difficulty of using con-
- Starkweather v. State, 167 Neb. 477, 484, 93 N.W.
2d 619, 623 (1958).
'7 44 N.J. 453, 210 A.2d 193 (1965).
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temporary mental health personnel within the
framework of a rule that makes psychological
abnormality legally relevant to existence of actual
state of mind. The psychiatrist mouthed the magic
words that Sikora lacked the ability to form the
intent or to entertain the desire to cause death, but
a consideration of his testimony as a whole leaves
little doubt that this misstates his position. Sikora,
according to the expert, entertained a conscious
desire to cause the death of his victim and perhaps
considered acting on this desire to an extent suffi-
cient to constitute premeditation. These conscious
mental states and processes, however, like the
actions of the defendant, were greatly influenced by
unconscious factors. Sikora did not lack the mental
state required for liability, but the mental state as
well as his actions was the result of unconscious
influences; this is the substance of the testimony in
Sikora and numerous other cases. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey, which has been more alert
than most other courts to the discrepancy between
the proof offered in many cases and the matters at
issue under the applicable doctrine,6 held that the
proof was admissible only as going to sentence or
punishment.
If a person thinks, plans and executes the plan
at [the conscious] level, the criminality of his act
cannot be denied, wholly or partially, because,
although he did not realize it, his conscious was
influenced to think, to plan and to execute the plan
by unconscious influences which were the product
of his genes and his lifelong environment. 61
Other courts, however, which either did not see the
lack of logical relevance, or merely suspected it,
would likely be reluctant to exclude such testimony
on the ground that in a serious case the jury
"should" have a full picture of the defendant.
The danger that this state of affairs poses is this:
the use of psychological abnormality to disprove
intent is sometimes logically valid. Traditional
substantive criminal law doctrine, however, does
not make relevant many of the theoretical con-
siderations which many feel should be taken into
account in determining whether to punish or how
much to punish. 'There is a strong tendency to
Is In State v. Di Paolo, 34 N.J. 279, 168 A.2d 401
(1961), the court approved of admission of evidence
of psychological abnormality which "rationally bears"
upon the existence of the state of mind required. This
language was relied upon in Sikora to emphasize that
the court took its doctrinal position in Di Paolo seri-
ously and would require logical relevancy.
69 State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 470, 210 A.2d 193,
202 (1965).
urge upon courts psychological explanations that
are simply not logically relevant to the issue for
which they are offered. The rule often, then, serves
as a fiction, a vehicle for placing a full dynamic
explanation of the offenders' behavior before the
trier of fact.7' This is not necessarily bad. It is
arguable that the jury's inherent power to acquit
or convict of lesser offenses (where mechanically
possible) will inevitably be exercised on the basis
of factors such as psychological abnormality. The
use of this fiction puts as much evidence before the
jury as possible and thereby maximizes the infor-
mation on which the decision will be made. On the
other hand, failure on the part of many courts to
recognize that the rule often operates as a fiction
creates confusion in the appellate cases which is
likely to extend to the trial courtroom. In addition,
the necessity of observing the niceties of the fiction
prevents the court from assisting the jury in evalu-
ating the evidence by appropriate instructions and
10 To some extent, existing rules admitting such evi-
dence are undoubtedly intentionally used as a fiction
to accomplish a result unrelated to the formal purpose
of the rule. Dr. Bernard L. Diamond has admitted as
much in discussing testimony which psychiatrists may
give under the California rule:
Actually, the law is not interested in... medi-
cal categorizing of who does or does not have malice
aforethought. What it wants to know is whether,
in the case of the particular individual on trial,
did the criminal action result from a voluntary,
deliberate choice such as normal, reasonable per-
sons appear to make in their daly lives, or was it
the result of pathological forces arising far below
the conscious level over which the defendant had
little power of control.
Diamond, With Malice Aforethought, 2 ARcHrvEs oF
CRnMNAL PsYcHoDYNAMcs 1, 29 (1957). Cf. Meyers,
The Psychiatric Determination of Legal Intent, 10
J. FoRENSIC SCIENCE 347 (1965), in which the author
dearly conceives of "legal intent" as including far
more than conscious awareness.
These comments apply directly to the psychoanalyti-
cally-oriented mental health professionals. See P.
RocHE, THE CRnINAL Mn 87-88 (1958), for an
exposition of the psychoanalytic or "dynamic" view of
"intent" and "motivation." Because of the law's prefer-
ence for mental health experts with a medical back-
ground and the strong influence of psychoanalytic
theory upon the medical profession, psychoanalytically-
oriented psychiatrists are the primary source of testi-
mony in criminal cases. There are, of course, other
theoretical orientation among mental health professions.
See generally U. NEISSER, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 4-5
(1967). But the principal alternative, behavioral theory,
rejects (in its extreme views) any need or value to in-
vestigation of so-called mental processes. Id. at 5,
292-95. Cognitive psychology is directly concerned
with the processes between experience and overt be-
havior: perception, memory, problem-solving, and
thinking. Id. at 4. But little uf this work has reached
the point where it is of direct value to such complex
tasks as evaluating the mental processes of an offender
at a given past time.
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comments. Even "gut equity" might benefit by
the instructions or the summing up of an experi-
enced trial judge.
Moreover, the use of the rule in this manner
makes it subject to what is probably the most
significant objection to the M'Naghte formulation
of the insanity defense: it unfairly places the bur-
den of formally invoking the fiction upon the ex-
pert witnesses?' For the law to operate with such
a fiction, it would be necessary for expert witnesses
to mouth the "magic words," as did the psychia-
trist in Fisher. To some extent, this creates dis-
comfort on the part of the experts and dissatis-
faction among them with the legal process.
7y2 It
thus works against the development of the "bridge
between medicine and the law" 78 which is essen-
tial to the adequate administration of any legal
rule which takes into account the psychology of
the offender.
C. Psychological Abnormality As Establishing a
Lack of a Causal Relationship Between Mens
Rea and the Act
Traditional criminal law doctrine requires not
only a state of mind and an act for liability, but
also a concurrence of these elementsY4 Concur-
rence in this context has been regarded as meaning
a causal relationship: to establish liability, the act
must be the result of the offender's state of mind 5
Although there has been no discussion of the rela-
tionship of this requirement to the offender's
psychological abnormality, the possibility seems
worth considering.
71 OYAL CoMInssION ON CAPIAL PUNISHMENT
1949-53, REx'oT 103-04 (1953):
[The burden of 'stretching' the M'Naghten
Rules, so as to avoid the unfortunate results of
their strict application, falls largely and unfairly
on medical witnesses.... It is unfair to the medi-
cal witness to place him in a position where he is
aware that his evidence as to the nature and degree
of the prisoner's mental disease and its effect on
his responsibility may be treated as irrelevant
unless he is prepared to hazard the opinion that at
the crucial moment the prisoner was probably
unaware of the wrongfulness of his act.7 2Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally
Ill, 15 SrA. L. Rxv. 59 (1961). Diamond states, "I
don't like having to take refuge in such semantic de-
vices." Id. at 62. '
73Id. at 51. The Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment concluded that relieving experts of the
embarrassment of the fiction would "do much to im-
prove the quality of psychiatric evidence" offered in
insanity trials. ROYAL ComzsSioN ON CAPiTAL PUN-
ismsxNT 1949-53, REPORT 104 (1953).74See generally R. PERINs, CRnMINAL LAW 834-36
(2nd ed. 1969).75 Id.
Much of the testimony regarding psychological
abnormality received in those jurisdictions approv-
ing its use amounts not to a denial that the state
of mind required for liability did exist but rather
that factors other than the conscious desire or
awareness were influential in causing the criminal
conduct. While the "concurrence" requirement has,
in the few cases in which it has been raised, been
applied to situations in which the state of mind
and the act existed at different times,76 there
is no reason why a state of mind that exists at the
time of an act and which might have "caused" the
act cannot be shown in fact, not to have caused
the act. The traditional concurrence requirement
could not, thereby, be established.
But this use of the concurrence requirement may
be little more satisfactory than the use of the state
of mind requirement itself. The concurrence re-
quirement was formulated in a context far differ-
ent from that of psychological abnormality, tend-
ing to show that actions were caused by factors
other than the conscious "will" of the actor. Tra-
ditionally, it has not been regarded as involving
the issue of volition, which has been relegated to
the insanity defense. The use of psychological
abnormality to disprove concurrence on the basis
that it is within the logic, if not the substance, of
the requirement is again subject to the objection
that the concurrence requirement is a poor vehicle
for grading offenses. Concurrence has traditionally
been an all-or-nothing proposition; either the state
of mind caused the act or it did not. To use this
as a vehicle for grading offenses, it would be neces-
sary that to grade offenses according to the com-
parative role conscious intent played in causing the
act. Given the state of the clinical skills mental
health professions have to work with, it is doubtful
whether the law could administer a system that
required that offenders be so categorized.
On the other hand, such an approach would be
doctrinally easier to integrate with the insanity
defense in those jurisdictions in which volitional
impairment is a basis for the defense. An absence
of "substantial" capacity to control conduct (and
a corresponding "complete" domination by un-
conscious or mechanical factors) could give rise
to a complete defense to liability. A showing of
only a significant loss of control (or a significant
76 See, e.g., State v. Rider, 90 Mo. 54, 1 S.W. 825
(1886) (error to instruct jury in such a manner that
defendant would be guilty of murder even if he aban-




influence by unconscious factors) could reduce the
offense one grade (if offenses were graded gen-
erally).
D. Psychological Abnormality As Proof of Non-
existence of a Modified Mens Rea
If the traditional mens rea doctrines are inade-
quate vehicles for integrating the psychology of
the offender and the imposition of criminal liabil-
ity, an alternative would be to modify the mens
rea requirement so as to make psychological assess-
ment of offenders more meaningful. Several recent
developments bear upon this possibility.
1. Integration into M ens Rea of "Instrumentality"
William J. Chambliss, summarizing the deterrent
effect of criminal punishment, has concluded that
the research suggests that the effectiveness of
punishment depends upon two factors: the "in-
strumental" or "expressive" nature of the act,
and the degree of the actor's commitment to crime
as a "way of life." 77 If severe punishment is to be
imposed where it is most likely to deter, then, it
should be concentrated on those with little com-
mitment to crime as a way of life and for whom
the criminal act is instrumental rather than ex-
pressive. Neither factor is formally integrated into
the substantive criminal law, although habitual
criminal statutes make some minimal attempt to
single out for more severe punishment those whose
commitment to crime has manifested itself in
several convictions. "The notion of intent,"
Chambliss correctly points out, "is not sufficient
to differentiate expressive and instrumental
acts." 71 "[Tihe possibility of doing so," he con-
tinues, "through a similar legal category is cer-
tainly not farfetched." 79
The suggestion that the mens rea requirement be
modified to distinguish between instrumental and
expressive acts raises numerous problems, how-
ever. Since it is largely a suggestion that a sophis-
ticated notion of "motive" be integrated into mens
rea, it iF subject to the traditional criticism of
considering motive as a general matter. If "ex-
pressive" is broadly defined as meaning expressive
of a conscious or unconscious need, it would be
difficult or impossible in specific cases to draw the
line. In all cases, a crime is instrumental to some
extent, although the instrumental nature of some
77 Chambless, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness
of Legal Sanctions, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 703, 712 (1967).
78 Id. at 718.
79 Id.
acts may be more obvious than that of others.
For example, the instrumental characteristic of the
act of the heir who kills to secure an inheritance
may be superficially clear, but is it really any
different in nature than the act of the latent homo-
sexual who kills to reassert his masculinity? Both
acts are obviously instrumental but the goals
differ most significantly in their susceptibility to
proof.
Chambliss's suggestion would also be mechan-
ically difficult to implement. Most statutory struc-
tures would not readily lend themselves to dis-
tinguishing between situations alike in all respects
other than that one involved an instrumental act
and the other an expressive act. Even those statu-
tory schemes in which offenses are placed into a
limited number of categories do not seem to offer
significant possibilities. A rule that provided that
if the defendant established that his act was
"expressive" rather than instrumental the offense
would be one grade below what it would otherwise
be would seem to oversimplify the problem.
2. Minor Modifications of Existing State of M1find
Requirements: The California Experience
An examination of the California homicide cases
since WTells85 suggests that the states of mind re-
quired for the homicide offenses in that jurisdiction
have been undergoing significant changes. It is
likely that this represents the effort by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court to integrate the substantive
law with the evidence regarding the dynamics of
offenders' behavior. Such evidence was coming
before the courts in greater quantities after Wells.
This effort potentially holds valuable lessons for
the use of psychological abnormality in the homi-
cide area for other jurisdictions and in offenses
other than homicide in California as well as else-
where.
The first major development following Wells was
People v. Gorshen,& decided in 1959. Although the
court affirmed the conviction of Gorshen for second
degree murder, the court in dicta made clear that
8 33 Cal.2d 330, 202 P.2d 53, cert. denied, 338 U.S.
836 (1949). See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
151 Cal.2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959), affirming 326
P.2d 188 (Cal. \pp. 1958). In People v. Baker, 42 Cal.
2d 550, 268 P.2d 705 (1954), the court had found error
in an instruction that the defendant in a homicide
trial was conclusively presumed "sane and of sound
mind," since this told the jury not to consider evidence
of the defendant's mental retardation and epilepsy in
determining his ability to premeditate and deliberate.
This, however, was a necessary result given Wt'.', and
represents no significant expansion.
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the evidence of Gorshen's mental illness had been
properly received as proving lack of malice afore-
thought. But the opinion shows the beginnings of
a recognition of inconsistency between the testi-
mony admitted under the Wells rule and the sub-
stantive law governing the degrees of criminal
homicide. First, voluntary manslaughter was
defined under California law (as under the law of
many states) as an intentional killing committed
upon a "sudden quarrel or heat of passion" 8 2
which had been held to require reasonable provo-
cation.83 This seemed to preclude use of voluntary
manslaughter as a lesser offense if lack of malice
aforethought was proven. The court solved this
doctrinal dilemma by creating a "new" category
of voluntary manslaughter, defined simply as an
unlawful killing without malice aforethought. The
distinction between this category of voluntary
manslaughter and murder, unlike the distinction
between traditional voluntary manslaughter and
murder, is subjective.
The subjective criterion to be applied, however,
obviously caused the court some concern. The
testimony at trial had been essentially as follows."9
Gorshen, a longshoreman, had been severely
schizophrenic for many years, and because of his
hallucinations often came precariously close to
psychological collapse. As he lost his sexual powers,
his work as a longshoreman took on unconscious
symbolic value as proof of his manhood. When the
victim, Gorshen's foreman, asked Gorshen to
leave work because of his drinking, this seemed to
Gorshen's unconscious to be a deprivation of
sexual normalcy and powers. Gorshen's uncon-
scious reacted to this threat to his sexual powers by
causing him to strike back violently at the source
of the threat. Although the expert witness testified
C2  . PENAL CoDE §192(1) (West 1970). Evidence
of provocation not sufficient to reduce a killing from
murder to homicide had been earlier held relevant to
the determination of whether the defendant had the
intent to kill and whether he acted following premedi-
tation. This, however, had the effect only of reducing
the offense to second degree murder. People v. Valen-
tine, 28 Cal.2d 121, 169 P.2d 1 (1946). Prior cases had,
however, recognized that intoxication might disprove
the existence of malice aforethought and reduce the
offense to manslaughter. People v. Chesser, 29 Cal.2d
815, 178 P.2d 761 (1947). This implied recognition of a
category of voluntary manslaughters other than those
amounting to reductions by virtue of provocation.
8See, e.g., People v. Valentine, 28 Cal.2d. 121, 136-
44, 169 P.2d 1, 11-15 (1946). But cf. Coshow, Classii-
cation of Homicide Law in California from Recent De-
cisions, 1 HASTINGs L. J. 32 (1950).
84 People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal.2d 716, 722-23, 336
P.2d 492, 495-96 (1959).
conclusorily that Gorshen did not have the mental
state required for malice aforethought or premedi-
tation "or anything which implies intention, de-
liberation or premeditation," he did not specifically
controvert Gorshen's own testimony that at the
time of the shooting he entertained the conscious
desire to shoot the victim. Apparently, the court
resolved this logical inconsistency between the
testimony and the substantive law, under which
an intent to kill or inflict serious bodily injury
suffices for malice aforethought, by tacitly approv-
ing the definition of the "medical essense" of
malice aforethought which the medical expert was
permitted over objection to give at trial: malice
aforethought exists when "'an individual performs
an act as a result of his own free will or intention-
ally,'" as opposed to those situations in which
"'the action is directly attributable to some ab-
normal compulsion or force, or symptom or dis-
eased process from within the individual.' "85
This, of course, makes the state of mind a voli-
tional concept, and flies in the face of traditional
state of mind doctrine. The court did not ex-
pressly approve the "medical" definition and in
fact declined to "undertake the task of formulating
an inclusive or comprehensive definition of malice
aforethought." 88 Yet acceptance of the substance
of this definition seems the only way in which the
court could have found the medical testimony
logically relevant. After this extensive doctrinal
discussion, however, the court concluded that the
trial judge had reasonably disregarded the expert
testimony and that the conviction for second de-
gree murder was supported by the evidenceY
The conflict between the psychological testimony
received under the Wells rule and the substantive
law was presented more directly in 1964 in People
v. Wolff.P Wolff, a fifteen year old youth, had
killed his mother pursuant to a bizzare plan to
rape or photograph nude a number of girls. The
plan required that his mother be gotten "out of
the way." There was expert testimony that Wolff
was khizophrenic. The jury, however, rejected the
insanity plea. The court convicted Wolff of first
degree murder and imposed a sentence of life
imprisonment. The California Supreme Court
found support for the jury finding of legal responsi-
bility but held that Wolff, by virtue of his youth
"I Id. at 723, 336 P.2d at 496.
81 Id. at 730 n. 11, 336 P.2d at 501 n. 11.




and psychological abnormality, was not capable of
the mental processes first degree murder requires.
In so holding, the court significantly altered the
substantive definition of premeditation. Drawing
upon prior assertions that the extent of the re-
flection upon the contemplated crime is the bench-
mark of first degree premeditation, the court held
that the defendant must "maturely and meaning-
fully" reflect upon the gravity of the contemplated
act.89 "Maturely and meaningfully" was defined
functionally by observing that the degrees of
murder are designed to distinguish among offenders
according to their "quantum of personal turpi-
tude" and "personal deprivaty." 90 Although Wolff
had apparently reflected upon the killing of his
mother to the full extent of which he was capable,
he failed to realize the enormity of the evil and
the consequences of the act. His conviction was
therefore modified to second degree murder.
People v. Conley9' presented the same question
in regard to the distinction between murder and
voluntary manslaughter, the "malice afore-
thought" issue with which Wells had dealt. Conley
had killed his girl friend and her husband after a
period of extensive drinking. In addition to Con-
ley's own testimony that he did not intend to kill
the victims and that he did not remember doing
so, the defense introduced evidence that the
amount of alcohol he had consumed would impair
the judgment of an average person and, through
a psychologist's testimony, that he "was in a
dissociative state at the time of the killings and
because of personality fragmentation did not func-
tion with his normal personality." 92 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court reversed the convictions
for first degree murder on the ground that the
trial court had erroneously failed to instruct the
jury on manslaughter. In the course of its discus-
sion, the court developed the concept of malice
aforethought in a manner similar to that accorded
premeditation in Woff. "An awareness of the
obligation to act within the general body of laws
regulating society," it held, is implied in the statu-
tory definitions of malice aforethought, even
though it is not necessary that the defendant
know that his particular act is prohibited.93 "If
because of mental defect, disease, or intoxication
89 Id. at 822, 394 P.2d at 976, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
90 Id. at 820, 394 P.2d at 974-75, 40 Cal. Rptr. at
286-87.
9164 Cal.2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815
(1966).
92 Id. at 315, 411 P.2d at 914, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
93 Id. at 322, 411 P.2d at 918, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
... the defendant is unable to comprehend his duty
to govern his actions in accord with the duty im-
posed by law, he does not act with malice afore-
thought," 94 the court declared, pointing to Gorshen
as evidence that a killer might act with intent and
premeditation but not with malice aforethought.
In the recommended instructions for such cases,
the court directed that the jury be told that to
have malice aforethought, a defendant must have
the ability to comprehend the legal prohibition
against endangering the lives of others and his
obligation to conform his conduct to this stand-
ard.9
5
In a number of cases following Wolff, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court reduced convictions of first
degree murder to second degree on the ground
that the evidence failed to sustain a finding of
premeditation within the Wolff definition." These
cases were followed, however, by several cases in
which the court treated evidence of psychological
abnormality with much less sympathy.9 In People
v. Morse,98 for example, the court held that despite
Conley, the trial court had not erred in refusing
to instruct on voluntary manslaughter in a trial
concerning a killing committed on death row.
There was expert testimony that once the assault
began, the killing was automatic and instinctual,
and that because of a personality disorder Morse
lacked "the capacity to think in terms of usual
values of morality. He [was] without the ability,
in other words, to think in moral terms." 99 Hold-
ing that this did not even raise the issue of his
" Id.
95 rd. at 324 n. 4, 411 P.2d at 920 n. 4, 49 Cal. Rptr.
at 824 n. 4.
91 People v. Bassett, 69 Cal.2d 122, 443 P.2d 777,
70 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1968); People v. Nicolaus, 65 Cal.2d
866, 423 P.2d 787, 56 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1967); People v.
Goedecke, 65 Cal.2d 850, 423 P.2d 777, 56 Cal. Rptr.
625 (1967); People v. Ford, 65 Cal.2d 41, 416 P.2d 132,
52 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966).
17 In addition to Morse, see People v. Bandhauer, 1
Cal.3d 609, 463, P.2d 408, 83 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1970)
(First degree murder conviction affirmed despite evi-
dence of severe neurosis, mild to moderate paranoia,
personality disorders, chronic alcoholism and psycho-
motor epileptic seizures when the alcohol in the ac-
cused's blood reached a certain level); In re Kemp, 1
Cal.3d 190, 460 P.2d 481, 81 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1969);
People v. Risenhover, 70 Cal.2d 39, 447 P.2d 925, 73
Cal. Rptr. 553 (1968) (Emphasis placed on expert
testimony that accused was not "psychotic" and that
his capacity for deliberation was not below average, an
apparently rational motive for the crime, the rational
method of varrying the crime out, and lay testimony
that nothing unusual was observed about accused).
98 70 Cal.2d 711, 452 P.2d 607, 76 Cal. Rptr. 391
(1967).
99 Id. at 733 n. 15, 452 P.2d at 620 n. 15, 76 Cal.
Rptr. at 404 n. 15.
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capacity to entertain malice aforethought, the
court noted that there was a lack of proof concern-
ing whether Morse lacked the awareness that his
action was contrary to law and, surprisingly,
stated that mere incapacity or disinclination to
obey law by virtue of personality disorder can-
not establish lack of malice aforethought. These
later cases resemble the treatment given the matter
by the lower California appellate courts, which
have generally been unwilling to second-guess
trial courts' conclusions on the issue0 0°
How should the California experience be evalu-
ated? First, it seems clear that the extensive use
in trial courts of the Wells doctrine convinced the
California Supreme Court that the traditional
formulations of the state of mind requirements for
homicide offenses were not adequate vehicles for
using evidence of psychological abnormality. The
objective distinction between murder and man-
slaughter that fell in Gorshen was the most obvious
barrier. Wolff and Conley, however, represent
attempts to modify the states of mind required
for first and second degree murder. In both, how-
ever, the court spoke in cognitive terms: reflection,
understanding of the act, comprehension of the
legal prohibitions and the obligation to conform.
This does not seem to have provided a very satis-
factory vehicle for expert testimony. The experts
speak in general terms of "disassociation" and
impaired consciousness, but seem unable to be
precise on the actual cognitional processes of the
defendant. The experts talk in terms of conscious
and unconscious factors in reacting to stress, and
seem to feel little more comfortable under Wolff
and Conley than under M'Naghten.
The California rule is subject to the criticism
that in practice, as far as can be determined, it
emphasizes relatively superficial factors and de-
tracts, therefore, from a sophisticated use of psy-
chological insight. As the California Supreme
Court has dealt with the rule, the cases have
turned on such factors as youth, the presence of
00 See People v. Caylor, 259 Cal. App.2d 191, 66
Cal. Rptr. 448 (1968); People v. Juarez, 258 Cal.
App.2d 344, 65 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1968). See also People
v. Moore, 257 Cal. App.2d 740, 65 Cal. Rpt. 450
(1968) (upholding a conviction for second degree
murder despite the absence of prosecution evidence on
diminished capacity); People v. Hokie, 252 Cal. App.2d
901, 61 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1967) (Conviction for assault
with intent to commit murder upheld despite evidence
of psychological abnormality). In People v. Muszalski,
260 Cal. App.2d 611, 67 Cal. Rptr. 378 (1968), it was
held not prejudicial error in a pre-Conley trial to fail to
give instructions on the Wells rule despite defense
evidence of psychological abnormality.
stereotyped symptoms of mental illness, the bizarre
nature of the crime, or the existence of an apparent
rational motive. It is no coincidence that many of
the cases involved killings of family members by
other family members--Conley involved a quasi-
family situation. To some extent this undoubtedly
represents the view stated by one of the experts
in People v. Nicolausln1 that anyone who kills his
own children without provocation is not legally
responsible, whether the test is "sanity" under
M'Naghten or ability to premediate under Wolff.
Is this oversimplification inherent in the ap-
proach taken by the California Supreme Court,
or is it rather the cautious early application of a
doctrine that has the potential for more sophisti-
cated application? It is probably inherent in the
court's approach. Despite the effort the court has
expended, it has gone no further than to develop
the cognitive aspects of the state of mind require-
ments. Although the discussions in Wolff and
Conley circle around problems other than those
things within the conscious awareness of the de-
fendant, they ultimately come to rest upon a rule
phrased in traditional cognitive terms. The opin-
ions give the impression that the underlying basis
for the decisions is something other than the scope
or intensity of the defendants' conscious aware-
ness, but the court was unwilling or unable to
justify the decision in terms of these other factors.
In Morse, moreover, the court apparently recog-
nized and disclaimed the glimmerings of a more
expansive revision of the state of mind require-
ments.
This is not to say that the ameliorating effect of
Gorshen, Wolff and Conley is not appropriate where
it applies. It does not, however, provide a satis-
factory vehicle for doctrinal analysis of more com-
plex and sophisticated problems, such as the de-
gree of liability which the law should attach to
Morsel The California development of the homi-
10165 Cal.2d 866, 423 P.2d 787, 56 Cal. Rptr. 635
(1967).
1
0 2 Cf. the problem posed by Professor Norval Morris
in Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerozs Criminal 41 So.
CAL. L. R.v. 514 (1968):
It is too often overlooked that one group's ex-
culpation from criminal responsibility confirms the
inculpation of other groups. Why not permit the
defense of a dwelling in a Negro ghetto?... [Aid-
verse social and subcultural background is statisti-
cally more criminogenic than is psychosis; like in-
sanity, it also severely circumscribes the freedom
of choice which a nondeterministic criminal law(all present criminal law systems) attributes to
accused persons.
By phrasing the issue as the availability of the "de-
fense of living in a ghetto," Morris confuses the prob-
19711
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cide states of mind represents a valiant effort, but
not one that seems to hold much promise for a
general integration of gradation of criminal lia-
bility and psychological abnormality.
IV. EVALUATION OF THE ATTEMPT TO INTEGRATE
THE GRADING OF OFFENSES AND THE PSYCHO-
LOGICAL ABNORMALITY OF THE OFFENDER
Given the problems caused by attempts to
integrate the psychology of the offender and the
degrees of criminal liability in practice and others
that can be anticipated from more extensive
efforts, l0 3 is the task worth while? In part, this is
merely a restatement of arguments that have long
been made regarding the insanity defense and the
entire concept of mens rea. But they are worth
restating here.
Several argument.- can be made for making
such attempts. First, doctrinal consistency de-
mands it. The law requires defined states of mind.
If psychological abnormality of some type is
logically inconsistent with these states of mind,
fairness and logic demand that such abnormality
be the subject of legal investigation. Second, psy-
lem. There is no defense of "psychosis." In both cases
the isue is the effect of the factor upon the individual's
psychology. Either psychosis or physical environment
might affect an individual's psychological functioning
so as to have some impact upon his criminal liability.
But if the law seeks to determine the less blatant
effects of such factors as ghetto living upon an offender's
psychology and tlen integrates it into his criminal lia-
bility, it is necessary to have a doctrinal vehicle which
not only makes the investigation relevant but inte-
grates it into the scheme for determining and grading
criminal liability in a manner which furthers the policy
objectives of the criminal law. Use of the insanity de-
fense, of course, may flounder upon restrictive (and
probably unrealistic and indefensible) definitions of
"mental illness." For present purposes, the issue is
whether there is another doctrinal way of accomplish-
ing this.
103 There are several problems beyond the scope of
this discussion which are probably not insurmountable.
One is the problem of combining admissibility of psy-
chol.gical abnormality for purposes other than estab-
lishing the complete defense of insanity and "split trial"
procedures. See State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 471 P.2d
715 (1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3313 (U.S. Jan.
18, 1971) (Dictum that split trial procedure did not
permit evidence of "insanity" to be introduced as to
state of mind and therefore violated due process). A
trial could easily be split so as to separate factual issues
,ther than those relating to state of mind from those
that do relate to state of mind, whether state of mind
goes to insanity, grade of offense, mitigation, or any
other matter. The problem of a possible justification for
preventive detention, following service of a prison term
(see text accompanying note 35 supra) could be readily
solved by invoking existing authority for "civil" hos-
pitahzation. Prior ciminal acts would certainly be
relevant to a subject's present dangerousness.
chological abnormality bears on "personal turpi-
tude," and the law, if it is to maintain the com-
munity's respect, must grade its condemnation
according to the moral turpitude of the offender
as the community evaluates it. The need to have
criminal law accurately express community con-
demnation therefore requires this investigation.
Third, a humanitarian argument can be made
that consideration of psychological abnormality
minimizes the penal sanctions imposed upon those
who, as a group, need "treatment." Although it
does not, as the insanity defense does, release them
immediately for "treatment," it does minimize
the extent to which treatment must be postponed
to permit the law to extract its vengeance. Fourth,
consideration of psychological abnormality seems
a logical corollary to the utilitarian premises of
the criminal law: punishment must be justified by
crime prevention, and the imposition of severe
punishment upon the psychologically abnormal is
not so justified. Consideration of psychological
abnormality would help restrict the imposition of
punishment to those cases in which it can most
likely be expected to achieve its preventive effect.
Finally, formally recognizing the relevance of
psychological abnormality would amount to a
realistic accommodation of the inevitable.' Triers
of fact will continue to be confronted with the
formal all-or-nothing choice of the insanity de-
fense in cases where any reasonable man would
seek a compromise. Rather than ignore this situa-
tion, the law would best serve its goals if it recog-
nized the relevance of the psychological abnormal-
ity short of insanity and used formal doctrine to
10 There is some evidence of the effect of such a
change in the experience following the enactment of
the English Homicide Act of 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11,
§2, which made available a limited defense of dimin-
ished responsibility. See text accompanying note 53
supra. 1 N. WALxER, CRanE AND INsANITY IN ENGLAND:
THE HISTORICAL PzlsPECTVE 158-59 (1968), studied
murder trials from 1957 through 1963. His results sug-
gest that the increasingly large number of defendants
found guilty of manslaughter under the diminished
responsibility rule developed at the expense of a re-
duced number of successful insanity defenses and, to a
lesser extent, a decreased number of findings of in-
competence to stand trial. This may mean that triers of
fact were previously returning verdicts of not guilty
in regard to defendants who were not in fact within the
insanity criterion. If so, the rule increases the rationality
of the system and maximizes the opportunity for the
formal doctrine to helpfully guide actual practice.
On the other hand, if the doctrine causes triers of
fact to find a lesser degree of criminal guilt in regard
to defendants who are in fact legally entitled to a ver-
dict of not guilty by reason of insanity, it can scarcely
be said to be an improvement over the pre-1957 situa-
tion. Clearly more investigation is needed.
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assist the trier of fact in considering such abnor-
mality in a manner most consistent with the
objectives of the criminal law.
On the other hand, it can be argued that a
realistic evaluation of criminal law doctrine reveals
that the so-called state of mind requirement is
essentially a fiction. Doctrinal consistency does
not require investigation of psychological abnor-
mality, at least to the extent contemplated by some
of the advocates. Nor does the need to have the
criminal law reflect community judgments regard-
ing morality require it. It is doubtful whether the
community attaches much importance to the
distinctions between degrees of liability, assuming
that acquittal by reason of insanity does represent
a community judgment of a lack of moral culpa-
bility. Further, it is doubtful whether community
evaluations of moral culpability, whatever their
contents, turn upon the type of distinctions which
experience shows are considered if psychological
abnormality is made the subject of investigation.
Finally, assuming that there is a substantive
difference between incarceration resulting from
criminal conviction and other forms of treatment,
considering psychological abnormality as a factor
in grading the offense is an inefficient method of
giving effect to a humanitarian desire to maximize
the opportunity of the mentally ill to have treat-
ment. Outright acquittal serves this function
much better. The opportunity for transfer from
correctional to mental health facilities after con-
viction and imprisonment accomplishes the same
thing although it is probably less efficient.
Furthermore, it can be argued that insofar as
imposing punishment serves to reinforce the com-
munity's prohibitions against criminal acts, mini-
mizing the culpability of offenders by reducing
the condemnation formally accorded their acts
may ultimately reduce the effectiveness of the
standard in preventing others from offending.
Thus, consideration of psychological abnormality
for this purpose is subject to the same objections
as a broad general insanity defense. On a more
mechanical and perhaps practical vein, it might
well be doubted whether the task of making the
judgments required by a sophisticated rule which
grades offenses in part by psychological abnormal-
ity is within thc power of present triers of fact,
given the quality of expert assistance available. 10 5
105 See text accompanying notes 37, 38 supra, raising
the objections in the American cases, primarily in the
context of the "diminished capacity" approach and
accompanying note 58 supra, discussing the difficulties
As the Sirazan case illustrated, the dispute is likely
to leave a jury with little else to do but guess.
No matter how doctrinally sound, an inquiry
which is not mechanically feasible is scarcely a
good investment of time and effort.
Nor does it necessarily follow that consideration
of psychological abnormality is consistent with
utilitarian policy. There is a lack of evidence that
psychological abnormality renders an individual
significantly less subject to the preventive func-
tion of the threat of criminal punishment. In fact,
even if the assumptions of the psychodynamic
psychologists are accepted, it is still reasonable to
expect that the unconscious may be influenced
by the experience that those who commit antisocial
acts are punished.
On balance, the arguments in favor of consider-
ing psychological abnormality seem persuasive.
Whatever the present limitation on accurately
determining the psychological dynamics of particu-
lar offenders, the situation is likely to improve
with practice. Mental health professionals, engaged
in the treatment process, seldom have the oppor-
tunity to speculate concerning the mental processes
of an offender as they relate to the criminal law.
If the law expects such professionals to be of more
help than they have been in the past, it must
provide the opportunity for them to practice
their analysis. Perhaps this is where the greatest
value of the concept lies: it encourages courts,
the general public, and mental health personnel to
address themselves not only to broad questions
of crime prevention and general philosophical
issues related to punishment, but also to the prob-
lem of the specific offender and what should be
done in "this case." From continued experimenta-
tion in this area, it is reasonable to expect the
development of a more sophisticated ability to
analyze particular cases as well as the develop-
ment of a body of knowledge on which to build a
more realistic substantive criminal law.
But the traditional state of mind requirements
are not suited to serve as the vehicle for integration
of criminal liability and psychological abnormality.
Nor is there any apparent way of modifying or
replacing the traditional state of mind doctrine
with a more appropriate alternative. The best
solution would probably be to authorize a trier
of fact to find, in addition to guilt, that the de-
fendant was suffering from a psychological ab-
encountered with the "diminished capacity" approach
under the English Homicide Act.
1971]
GEORGE E. DIX
normality at the time of the offense which sub-
stantially reduced his culpability for the crime. If
such a finding were to be returned, the sentencing
authority should be required to take it into ac-
count and to impose a sentence less than the
maximum authorized for the offense. Culpability
should be defined for the trier of fact in terms of
ultimate blameworthiness, encompassing both
cognitive and volitional factors. This would per-
mit the trier of fact to follow instructions regarding
traditional state of mind requirements, and at the
same time assure him that a conclusion about
psychological abnormality would have some con-
crete effect upon the future of the offender. Ideally,
perhaps, psychological abnormality should affect
the formal liability imposed rather than the
punishment, but given the inadequacies of the
present doctrine, this is an unrealistic goal.
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